This paper examines several aspects of Israel's restructured retirement benefits system, focusing on distributive effects. We characterize 10 stylized representative prototypes of Israeli households, reflecting common demographic, wage and employment profiles. These prototypes are used to examine the joint effects of tax benefits for pensions and the public Old Age Allowances program's contributions and disbursements on the lifetime income distribution, net replacement rates at retirement and lifetime consumption smoothing. We find that the system is neutral in terms of its effect on lifetime income distribution, except for the top income decile which gains somewhat less than the others. We also find that pension savings result in a net loss for many low-income households, unsmooth their consumption and lead to "too high" post-retirement net replacement rates. Furthermore, evidence from a unique dataset point to rational and active behavior of most households with respect to these incentives. These findings suggest that the parameters of the retirement-age benefits system should be adjusted following the introduction of mandatory pensions. 
Introduction
Israel's pension and social-security Old-Age-Allowance (OAA) systems have undergone substantial reforms since 1995 dealing predominantly with their solvency.
The reforms, resembling those in many OECD countries (Salomaki, 2006; Dang et al., 2001) , included a rapid increase of the legal retirement age, substantial cuts in the terms offered by the defined-benefits occupational pension-funds for their existing members and closing these funds for new members. Additionally, newly hired publicsector employees were moved from employer-fully-funded arrangements to defined contribution -unsubsidized -private pension funds.
After the solvency risks were alleviated, policy-makers' focus shifted to poverty among the elderly. The high and rising overall poverty rates in Israel drew attention to the large proportion (about 22 percent) of old people living below the poverty line -in contrast to most OECD countries.
1 Additionally, the government was concerned about the fiscal costs of Social Security's means-tested Income-Supplement program and wanted to ensure that retirees will be able to provide for themselves instead of relying on public funds; there also was a concern that retirees take advantage of the meanstested support. 2 The main factor pointed-out as responsible for the limited availability of retirees' own-resources was too-little pension savings among those in the lower part of the income distribution (Table 1) . Consequently, the structure of tax incentives for long-term savings was altered to support almost exclusively pension savings (defined as savings towards the payment of a retirement-age annuity). Furthermore, in light of pending legislative intervention, employers and the trade-unions agreed to adopt a national pension accord from 2008, which was extended by government decree to cover all the employees.
Pensions offer two key advantages for individuals: 1) consumption smoothing over a life-time-span, including insurance for longevity 3 ; 2) potential financial gains due to direct government subsidies and tax breaks (financed by general taxation). With respect to the first advantage, it was argued that people may not save enough for retirement 1 Forster and Mira D'ercole (2005) find that only in 7 OECD countries poverty rates among the elderly are higher than for the whole population. 2 Part of this concern is that non-pension savings are not effectively accounted for in the calculation of the means-tested support, due to misreporting by applicants. 3 Insurance for longevity and its pricing is a major determinant of pension-benefits' value and a source for potential failures in the annuities market Poterba, 2002, 2004) . due to myopia about their needs at that age (Kotlikoff, 1987) . This myopia can reflect either "wrong" discount rates or ignorance/passiveness regarding future needs. 4 On the other hand, mandatory savings can result in "too much" savings for various types of workers and in sub-optimal distribution of disposable income through life (e.g, as related to balancing pension savings and the costs of raising children and paying mortgages), especially if individuals are rational and informed (Martin and Whitehouse, 2008) . Rational individuals are also expected to respond to the net financial benefits from pension savings reflecting the various tax and subsidy incentives. These incentives, however, may also generate "too much" savings.
Furthermore, savings incentives might significantly affect the cross-section life-time income distribution. 5 While the desired level of income redistribution is primarily a matter of social and political preferences it is important that decision-makers be aware of the consequences of various decisions, because in the case of pensions the results may not be fully visible.
This paper examines the distributive effects of Israel's pension system from several angles associated with the individual's point-of-view, as related to the potential effects of "Mandatory Pensions". First, we estimate the distributive effect of the prelegislation pension system by calculating the net lifetime financial gains from participating in the compulsory social-security OAA system and from choosing to join a pension-fund (accounting for the interactions between them). To make the analysis as realistic as possible we focus on typical life-time employment and income profiles depicted for prototypes derived from labor market and demographic data. This approach differs from various previous studies. 6 Then we point-out the potential effects of pension-savings on these net gains. Consumption smoothing is examined by analyzing pension replacement rates for various types of workers and the ratio of disposable income per "standardized' person in the household during the families' life.
A unique dataset -containing a panel of randomly selected 300,000 Israeli tax-payers (10 percent of the population) in 2000, 2005 and 2007 -is used to examine the individual and household characteristics associated with the decision to save for retirement and the degree to which individuals and households responded to the changes in pension regulations in recent years. Specifically, one of the implications of moving to a fully-funded defined contribution system is that low-income individuals (those below the income-tax threshold) no longer have direct financial gain from participating in the system. 7 Their response to this change can provide some insights as to whether individuals are indeed passive with respect to their pension savings.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides a short description of Israel's pension system and of the changes implemented since 1996. Section 3 provides information on characteristics of the Israeli labor force that were used to generate wage profiles and behavior patterns for the different household types used in the analysis. In Section 4 we calculate the net financial benefits from participating in Social-Security's OAA and saving for pension. We then calculate the programs' joint impact on the size and spread of life-time income of various household types. Section 5 evaluates the arguments in favor of mandating pension savings and Section 6
6 See e.g., Martin and Whitehouse (2008) , OECD (2005 OECD ( , 2007 and Bank of Israel (2008) . 7 The pension funds are still eligible to receive preferred government bonds paying 4.8 percent real annual return to cover 30 percent of their assets, but -accounting for management costs -this yield is not higher than long-term yields in the financial markets.
concludes by discussing the potential impact of the "Mandatory Pension" decree and highlighting issues and options for policy adjustment.
Characteristics of the Israeli pension system
Israel's retirement income system is based on a universal social-security pillar,
augmented by a means-tested income-supplement program, and on individual savings in pension funds. Until 2008 pension-fund savings were optional, but a government decree has now made such savings mandatory for incomes up to the average wage (an income level exceeded by roughly one third of all employees). This legislation complements an overhaul of Israel's pension system that began in 1995. To set the ground for the analysis this section briefly describes these changes and the current characteristics of the system.
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Until 1995 Israelis' retirement savings were concentrated in occupational pensionfunds which offered generous defined-benefit schemes. Public-sector employees, as well as those in large organizations such as the banks and the utility companies, were offered similar benefits in employer-funded programs with no direct employee contribution. Individuals could also enjoy tax benefits for depositing a portion of their uncovered salaries into private savings accounts -provided that the amounts were not withdrawn for at least 15 years from the date the account was opened.
Government support for pension-saving took two forms: tax allowances at the times of deposit and withdrawal and preferential yields for the deposited amounts. The pension funds received special non-tradable government bonds at above market yields (5.57 percent plus indexation to the CPI) to cover 93 percent of their deposits. Still, by the early 1990s it became clear that the benefits' generosity made the funds operations unsustainable -in line with developments in other developed countries (World Bank, 1994; Martin and Whitehouse, 2008) . Therefore, in March 1995 the funds were closed to new members and the rights of their existing members were somewhat reduced.
New pension funds were launched which were required to be actuarially balanced.
These funds still received preferential government bonds to cover 70 percent of their deposits, although the yield was reduced to 5.05 percent. The government also guaranteed a real return of 3.5 percent for the remaining 30 percent of their assets and assumed the risk of changes in longevity.
The 1995 reform was only a first step in the pension system's restructuring. Between 1995 and 2002 the government stepped away from the guarantee to the new pension funds' yields and for the risks associated with changes in life-expectancy. 9 After 2001 new public-sector employees were no long eligible to participate in the employerfunded pension scheme and were placed in the new pension funds. These modifications were, however, only a prelude for the 2003 reform.
In 2003, as part of the fiscal consolidation program, the government significantly reduced the benefits for pension savings at all levels. First, the retirement age was raised from 65 to 67 for men (phased-in until 2009 ) and from 60 to 64 for women (to be completed in 2017). At the same time tax benefits for early retirement were reduced and the preconditions for receiving early pensions toughened. The "old" pension funds were nationalized, the benefits for their existing members were substantially reduced and their contributions increased. The share of special government bonds issued for these funds was lowered to 30 percent of their assets, and instead the government offered a substantial one-off subsidy to cover the existing estimated actuarial deficits of the funds. 10 The government also removed its guarantee for the rights of the existing members.
The terms of pension savers in the "new" pension funds were also downgraded. The coverage of special government bonds was reduced to 30 percent of the funds' assets and the yield was lowered. Combined with raising the management fees the preferential return in the funds was essentially eliminated. The funds were also transformed to a pure defined-contribution setting which implied that the only financial benefit for investing in the funds is due to tax incentives.
Another policy change implemented gradually since 2003 was the removal of tax benefits for long-term savings not directly designed towards retirement-age annuities.
Since 2008 individuals are required to save in an annuity-oriented account a sufficient 9 The costs associated with this move for savers are discussed in Yosef and Spivak (2008) . 10 The actual payment will be phased-in over 35 years.
amount to ensure a pension equal at least to the minimum wage in order to qualify for tax benefits for additional savings towards a lump-sum payment upon retirement.
Finally (so far) in 2008 the trade-unions and the employers' organizations agreed on "mandatory pensions". This agreement was extended by government decree to all the employees. It mandates that each employee working for at least 6 months with the same employer will be insured in a pension-fund. Employees that already have an account with a pension-fund will be insured after the 3 rd month. Coverage under this decree applies to amounts up to the average national wage, and the legislation does not pertain to employees that were in a better scheme before the decree was issued.
The contributions are set to rise gradually and reach 15 percent (10 percent by the employer and 5 by the employee) by 2013.
Following the various reforms the current benefits for pension savings by the young cohorts in Israel are composed of four tax incentives:
1. Employer deposits into a pension fund or an employer-funded program up to 7.5 percent of the insured salary are non-taxable for the employee and exempt from social-security contributions. This provision covers salaries up to 4 times the average wage.
2. Employee contributions on the portion of their salary for which the employer also deposited are eligible for a 35 percent tax credit. This credit is provided for deposits of up to 7 percent of the insured income, for incomes up to the average wage. A credit of 5 percent is granted for the portion of income between the average wage and twice the average wage. Similar provisions exist for employees whose employers do not contribute to their pension savings.
3. The return on amounts deposited in pension funds is exempt from taxation. The key characteristics identified with the various datasets are the following:
1. Working people are typically married. More than three quarters of all the working individuals in the tax dataset were married; this share is quite stable across age groups (Table A-1) . Therefore, meaningful analysis of pre-retirement income patterns and post-retirement standard of living has to center on couples.
2. More than 90 percent of working adults between the ages of 40 and 65 have children (including those over the age of 18). More than 50 percent have at least three offsprings (Table A-1) . The larger number of parents compared to married individuals is mostly accounted for by divorced parents (Table A-2) .
3. More than three quarters of the working men and almost nine out of ten working women have a working spouse. There is a positive correlation between own-income and the probability that the wife is working (Table A-3).
4. The average age difference between male workers and their wives is about three years among couples in which both spouses work. Given the existing and planned official retirement ages this implies that married couples typically reach the retirement age at about the same time (Table A-4) .
5. From the Social Survey we find that men typically worked with few interruptions throughout their adulthood. However, those with low incomes experience somewhat longer breaks (Table A -5-I). A specific and quantitatively important sub-group is Arab (mostly manual) workers that tend to retire relatively early; this tendency is reflected to some extent in the persistently low share of work-years among Arabs over the age of 40 (Table A-5-II) . However, on average Arab men are likely to meet the 35-years minimum requirement for full-tenure at social-security because they can start working at age 18.
6. Working women tend to have much longer interruptions of their working life. This is correlated with having a large number of children (Table A -5-III) and with their income: those who reach monthly salaries of over 5,000 NIS work a proportion of their adult life that is only moderately lower than that of parallel men 13 -but they are less than a half of the working women (Table A -5-I). We also find the reverse phenomenon -the more experience women accumulated during their working livesthe higher their average income (Table A- those with lower education have an initial low wage which is rising by less than the national average wage over the course of their employment (that is, they have no premium for tenure).
8. Women's wages rise more moderately than men's, especially at the ages 30-45. This reflects the interruptions in their career and shorter working hours, especially in the periods of raising children (Brender and Gallo, 2008) . Even at the high-education level a significant share of women work part-time (Table A -6) . The wages of women with low-education tend to rise at a similar, or even higher, rate than men in these ages -but this may be due to a statistical artifact, since a large share of the women in this group does not work.
9. Consistent with the wage profiles identified above, the tax dataset shows significant persistence of individuals' rank in the income distribution within the main working age (30-55). While these data only cover a 5 years period they have the advantage of being based on a panel (Table A- 10. There is a strong correlation between workers' incomes and those of their spouses.
It is also much more common to find non-working wives of men with low incomes (Table A-8) .
Based on these observations we set up several prototypes of individuals which share the most common characteristics of the Israeli population in order to analyze the pension system. These are described in Table 2 and their detailed characteristics appear in Table A "Fast-track" successful couple, both with tertiary education and working fulltime. Two kids.
Single (divorced mother) with post-secondary education, two kids. Working part-time until the kids reach age 18. Housing costs are covered by alimony until the children reach age 18.
Academic degree for both husband and wife, 3 kids.
Academic degree for both husband and wife, 3 kids. Wife works 50 percent of a full-time job all her adult life. Post secondary education, wife has secondary education and works 20 years. Three Kids.
Secondary education, married to a non-working wife, 3 kids.
Bachelor, post-secondary education.
Post secondary education for both husband and wife, 2 kids.
Secondary education, wife working part-time when the children are in preschool age: 0.7 of full-time when the first child is born and 0.5 when the second is born. Three kids.
Loss/Benefit from Social Security and Pension Savings
The analysis of the net gains or losses from participating in the social-security OAA program and from contributing to a pension plan was based on the simulated wage profiles of the various types described in Table 2 . We first calculated the contributions and potential benefits in the -compulsory -OAA program and then the marginal benefit from choosing to save in a pension fund, accounting for potential offsets with the OAA. We focus on three parameters: 1) net life-time financial gain or loss from participating in a program, 2) the net replacement rate offered by the program relative to the last income earned by the employee, 3) the path of the ratio of disposable income to the "poverty-line" over the course of the individual's life.
Old-Age Allowances
The OAA program's three main components are the universal basic amount, the tenure-based supplement and the means-tested income-supplement. For two-worker couples with tenure of at least 35 years for each spouse (regardless of the hours worked or income during these years) the means-tested program is irrelevant because the sum of their regular benefits slightly exceeds those of the means-tested income-supplement. This latter program has disregard boundaries for labor income and pensions that differ between individuals and couples. Once the disregard level is exceeded the phase-out rate of the allowance is 60 percent, until it reaches the basicuniversal -amount (which includes the tenure supplement). Contributions to the OAA are based on a two-level schedule with a cap at 5 times the average wage. Direct contributions are not expected to cover the full-cost of the program for most individuals and the balance is covered by pre-specified government contributions.
To calculate the net benefits from the program each "type's" OAA annual contributions were simulated and accumulated using a real interest rate of 3.5 percent.
14 The accumulated contributions were compared to the value of the benefits the individual (or couple) are eligible for if they do not have a pension. For twoworker couples this typically means that they would receive the sum of their individual benefits (except if one of them did not work at least 35 years). For other couples and for singles the potential benefits include the means-tested supplement.
The calculated potential benefit is then capitalized by using pension-fund conversion coefficients for the equivalent amount and conditions.
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the life-time contributions and potential benefits of the OAA. It is evident that the program is very progressive and provides a large subsidy for low-income households. For higher-income households it offers a much smaller subsidy, but they still enjoy a net-benefit from participating. Only at the very top of the income distribution -about 15 percent of all households which are represented by "type 10" (and those on the range between types 9 and 10) -do the program contributions exceed the benefits. Table 4 shows that the OAA provides quite an adequate replacement rate for lowincome households: the replacement rate is close to 100 percent for "type 1" which represents about one fifth of the working population. "Type 2" also enjoys quite adequate replacement when accounting for job-related costs during their employment years. In contrast, the replacement rates appear to be insufficient for higher-income households. This is hardly surprising as the program's purpose is to protect the elderly from poverty, rather than provide a standard of living consistent with their employment income -especially when compared to the top of their earnings which is typically reached prior to retirement. 
Pensions
The placement of all new pension savers in Israel in pure defined contribution programs implies that the only net financial benefits from such savings are due to tax incentives. These benefits are granted in Israel mostly at the contribution stage but also at the time the annuities are disbursed. However, to enjoy these tax-benefits one has to reach the income-tax threshold -an income level which 45 percent of all employees (30 percent of working men) fall below. 17 Upon retirement, the annuity payments are taxed at the regular brackets with an additional discount on pensions up to about a third of the average wage. An additional tax benefit is granted to pensioners whose spouses have no pension, and Social security's OAA are tax-exempt. This implies that many of those who enjoyed tax advantages at the contribution stage enjoy a substantial -or full -exemption at the withdrawal stage as well.
To calculate the net benefits from pension savings we simulated the contributions of the employees (or households) through their (assumed) entire working life. 18 The hypothesized contribution rate for those who contribute was the maximum allowed by the tax-authorities, regardless of whether the individual's income is above the threshold for affecting tax benefits. This assumption is in the spirit of the "mandatory pension" decree and consistent with the current practice; it will be revisited below.
17 Only 3 percent of all employees reach the income level at which the cap on tax-exemptions for employer contributions -4 times the average wage -is effective. 18 The hypothesized alternative to pension savings is not saving at all. In this way we abstract from the tax exemption on the pension accumulation return.
Column 3 of Table 3 shows the capitalized value of the lifetime pension tax benefits granted to the household. These amounts include the capitalized sum of the tax benefits during the contribution period reduced by the taxes paid on the annuity -in line with the tax benefits at that stage. The benefits are quite small for the low-income types, reflecting their low income-tax rates -if they pay at all -throughout their working lives. 19 This is particularly true with respect to women who enjoy extra tax credits for their children. 20 In contrast, the tax benefits for high-income households are large and may even exceed the value of the OAA.
While all households may gain from the pension tax benefits, these gains can be offset, or even reversed, by a phase-out of the means-tested component of the OAA.
As discussed above this offset is relevant only for couples in which at least one spouse did not work 35 years and for singles. In such cases the magnitude of the offset depends on the joint annuities amount. Columns 4 and 5 show that this offset can be quite substantial. Household types 1, 2 and 6 -in which there is only a single worker with low income -actually lose from saving for a pension. These types represent a substantial share of households in Israel, especially in the populations targeted by the "mandatory pension" decree. 21 The mid-high income bachelor (type 4) loses about a third of the pension tax benefits but retains a positive incentive for savings. All the household types that represent two fully working spouses are not affected by the offset and retain their tax benefits (although in the case of the relatively low-income type 3 these are quite small).
Column 6 reports the net combined benefits from the OAA program and joining a pension fund (if yielding a net-gain). We find that there are only small differences between the various household types: low income ones enjoy a large net surplus in the OAA while the others replace these benefits with tax incentives. 22 The only, somewhat different household type is 10, which enjoys a smaller benefit due to high 19 The benefit is always positive due to the exemption of employer contributions from social-security. 20 The Israeli tax unit is the individual. Women receive an additional 0.5 tax credit (2.75 compared to 2.25 for men) and one more for each child. As a result only a relatively small fraction of working women -especially of working mothers -actually reaches the tax threshold (Brender, 2005 (Brender, , 2009 ). 21 Individuals with higher income at relatively old ages who lack the 35 years tenure and did not save for a pension may also lose from the legislation, but such individuals are quite rare. 22 The benefits for non-working individuals and households are of the same magnitude as those for working ones.
taxes on the annuities. Household types 4 and 6, which include singles, have similar benefits to the others -proportionally reduced to their size. Therefore it appears that, in their pre-mandatory-pension design, Israel's joint OAA and pension systems are neutral in terms of life-time income distribution.
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Column 2 of Table 4 shows the net replacement rates for the various types of households if they contribute to a pension fund through their entire working life.
These rates are calculated relative to the pre-retirement income, net of taxes, socialsecurity charges and pension contributions. It is evident that for low-income households full pension savings create too-high replacement rates, especially given that they also lose-out on a net basis from pension savings. For higher-income households the life-time savings produce a more moderate replacement rate, although still substantially higher than 100 percent. This may suggest that lifetime savings at the maximum permitted rates are too high, at least at the assumed real net return of 3.5 percent. It should be noted that the mandatory contribution rate from 2013 will be slightly higher than those assumed here. Furthermore, the tax-records data indicate that in practice the pensions of the current retirees that do collect a pension typically provide a replacement rate of about 40 percent (for the top 4 quintiles, excluding OAA). These rates are much lower than those mandated by the current law and similar to the prevailing rates in most OECD countries.
Pension contributions and income allocation through life
While the discussion of pensions is often focused on the need to secure an adequate standard of living for the elderly there is also the opposite concern: does the pension system produce "too much" savings? When decisions take place freely between market-priced pension-alternatives such a result is unlikely. However, the presence of tax-subsidy incentives and mandatory savings may lead to different outcomes.
The main reason why pensions can actually "unsmooth" consumption is that tax benefits are typically granted with an annual cap based on gross income, attempting to smooth contributions. This approach ignores the distribution of other expenses during 23 Although the taxes used to cover the residual cost of the OAA program are paid disproportionately by those at the top life-time income levels. Also, high-income households have to actually save for pension in order to enjoy the same benefits provided to low-income ones by the OAA.
a families' life -most notably on raising children and mortgages. Although a family could ideally spread mortgage payments over its entire life, typically they are paid during a limited period -while the "residence" consumption continues deep into retirement. The costs of child-raising are particularly relevant in Israel where families typically have 2 or 3 -and in many cases more -kids, child allowances are significantly lower than in most developed countries, and tax benefits for parents are small and limited to women.
To estimate the household's "appropriate" consumption level its simulated income (including child allowances) was divided by the number of "standard" persons, using the scale employed in the calculation of the "poverty line". We also deducted the simulated mortgage payments for those household types that are expected to have one -based on the national Expenditures Survey conducted by the Bureau of Statistics (Table 5) . 1 Percent of all households in the age-group. 
Myopia, Passivity and Irrationality of Savers
Some of the arguments for government intervention in the pension market relate to households' myopia with respect to post-retirement savings. It is argued that young persons underestimate their pension needs and are consequently "stuck" with too little resources when they retire. An observationally similar argument is that even if individuals are aware of these needs they tend to postpone action with respect to their pensions, so by the time they start saving it may be too late to accumulate sufficient funds to pay for a decent annuity. While distinguishing between optimization based on individual discount rates and myopia is not a trivial analytical issue, this section tries to examine the saving behavior of Israeli workers in this light. The analysis above suggests that saving for pension is a poor financial move for low-income individuals and for families with one earner -both in the present and during the course of adulthood. We also find that consumption smoothing would suggest that younger families that pay mortgages (which include a savings component) and those with children are likely to be less inclined to save at that stage of their life.
Chart 1 shows that pension contributions are indeed positively correlated with income. 25 In the bottom deciles of the employment-income distribution less than one fifth of working men and less than a third of working women save for pension while at the top deciles pension contributions are almost universal. In the lower deciles the larger share of women saving for pension compared to men is consistent with the fact that nearly 90 percent of working women have a working spouse (Table A- -Income has a strong and positive effect that rises throughout the relevant incomes range 27 . Consistent with expectations there is a strong and distinct negative effect for individuals with salaries below the income-tax threshold. Having a working wife also has a strong positive effect -as it reduces the potential loss from the phase-out of the income supplement.
-Having a wife that contributes to a pension-fund has an additional strong effect on the choice to save. Given the other variables in the equation this quantitatively important variable (0.12) is likely to reflect two factors: 1) the lower probability to be at the phase-out level of the OAA income supplement which is based on the joint 27 The joint effect of the coefficients of income and squared income begins to decrease at extremely high (hypothetical) incomes of more than 60 times the average wage.
pension income, 2) the wife's work experience: it is required to reach 35 working years to receive the full tenure supplement in the OAA, and women who contribute to pension have, on average, longer working spells than those who do not.
-The equation also points to the liquidity effect: the presence of children, especially young ones, in the household reduces the tendency to save for retirement.
-Single individuals (including divorced) tend to contribute less. This may reflect their larger probability to be eligible to the means-tested part of the OAA compared to married working couples.
-Arabs (identified as residents of Arab localities) are substantially less likely to contribute to a pension fund. This is consistent with the characterization of "Type 1"
as representing predominantly the Arab population. Notwithstanding the potential role of cultural influences, this result is also reflective of the unstable lifetime employment patterns of the Arab population and the very low probability that the wife will have any meaningful work history.
-The likelihood of savings for pension among immigrants that arrive in Israel since 1989 is strongly related to the age at which they arrive in Israel: the younger they were the more likely they are to save for pension. The age at which their probability to save becomes similar to that of the native population is 40. 28 This cut-off is broadly consistent with their need to accumulate both sufficient benefits in the pension arrangement and a large enough tenure supplement at the OAA to avoid a substantial loss due to the phase-out of the means-tested component.
-Age has a positive effect until retirement. This effect may be due to the phase-out of mortgage payments (Table 5) . It may also be associated with the reduction of pension benefits for those who started to work after 1995, but the continuing increase of the probability to save at the near-retirement cohorts is more consistent with the former explanation. This question is revisited below.
28 A 40 years old immigrant has 27 potential working years before retirement. The sum of the coefficient of "immigrated since 1989" and the coefficient of its interaction with "potential work years" multiplied by 27 is about zero; it becomes positive as the number of "potential work years" rises.
The analysis so far has focused on the snapshot of individuals' behavior in 2007.
Equation 2 have "old' pension arrangements. With this control we find that the age effect becomes negative until the mid-40s and is quantitatively significant and positive only after the age of 50, in line with the declining profile of mortgage payments depicted in Table 5 . Moreover, it is difficult to infer causality from these data because it may be that either, 1) employees seeking pension arrangements would prefer -ceteris paribuslarge employers that may find it easier to offer such coverage; or 2) that pension coverage decisions of large employers are exogenous to individual employees as part of a "package deal" of employment conditions. Nevertheless, although not precise, these data are indicative for the correlation between employer characteristics and pension coverage. (*) significant at the 1 percent level; (**) significant at the 5 percent level; (***) significant at the 10 percent level Table 9 shows a strong correlation between employer size and pension coverage. On average the probability that an employee in an enterprise with 50 employees will be covered is 40 percentage points lower than that for one in a 1,000 employee firm. We also find that the probability that employees who contributed to pension in 2000 and changed employer will contribute in 2007 is 9 percentage points higher than for employees who changed employer and did not have such coverage. Finally we find that workers who changed employers between 2000 and 2007 are more likely to save for pension the older they are and the higher their income is. Overall, the addition of the employer related variables adds 9 percentage points to the explained variance of pension coverage.
One of the proposed justifications for government intervention in the pension market is that individuals may be passive with respect to their retirement. As discussed above, the pension reforms between 2000 and 2005 eliminated the financial benefits from pension savings for workers at the bottom 5 deciles of the income distribution (since they do not reach the tax threshold and because the funds were converted to pure DC schemes -with no subsidy). Table 10 examines the response of workers to the changes that took place in the tax system between 2000 and 2005. It shows a marked decrease in the share of contributing individuals at the bottom 5 deciles and a much milder decrease at the higher ones. 30 There was also quite a noticeable decrease in employer contributions, suggesting that this component of savings also responded rapidly to the changes. Finally, the drop in contributions was much larger among the young cohorts, while among the older ones -in which many still belong to the pre-1995 schemes or to employer-funded programs -the decrease was milder 31 . It should be noted that the current retirees accumulated their pension benefits in a period where pension savings were optional. Therefore, these -perhaps -excessive (Table 10) , as the incentives for such contributions were eroded.
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Overall the behavior of workers with respect to their pension contributions seems to be rational and active: employees seem to adjust their saving choices in a way that is consistent with the financial incentives. It appears that the low contribution rates of low-income employees reflect the meager-financial incentives for pension savings, and the undesired consumption path in which such savings result. 32 Due to legislative changes the data after 2007 do not allow to monitor post-retirement savings.
Conclusion
Government intervention in the pension market is often justified by a need to protect the public from miscalculating and underestimating the advantages of saving for retirement. A similar argument is that young cohorts are too passive with respect to their post-retirement needs and may therefore act too late to ensure sufficient resources for that age. Another argument -to some extent an analytical opposite of the previous two -is that individuals optimize their life-time income profiles by taking (unfair) advantage of old-age income-support programs. All these arguments were used in the debate preceding the recent adoption of "mandatory pensions".
The current paper studied the reality of the Israeli pension system in its post-reform pre-mandatory-pension structure. Using stylized representative prototypes of the most common Israeli household compositions and employment profiles it examined the potential benefits of pension savings for each "type". The findings suggest that mandating pension savings imposes a net loss on low-income households that breaks the egalitarian feature of the current system: while at present all family types (except those at the top lifetime income decile) roughly enjoy the same subsidy/tax incentive, compulsory contributions will make the benefits for low-income households smaller than those of the others. This loss results from eroding their entitlement for the meanstested income supplement without offering offsetting effective tax incentives. 33 These calculations make the argument that low-income households take an excessive
advantage of the means-tested income support program less convincing.
The disadvantage of mandatory savings for low-income households is also evident in its impact on their life-time income distribution. The post-retirement replacement rates offered by the new system are over 140 percent for quite a significant group.
These high incomes come at the expense of low disposable income at younger ages, when households have to care for children and pay mortgages.
The analysis therefore shows that, given the existing level and structure of OAA, saving for retirement is not beneficial for low-income households while it is for 33 The recently adopted plan to raise the means-tested benefits for retirees at the oldest cohorts increases the loss inflicted on low-income families by mandatory pensions, but its magnitude does not qualitatively change the analysis.
higher-income ones. An examination of the households' behavior suggests that they indeed act in line with these calculations. Moreover, households' response to the restructuring of pension incentives between 2000 and 2005 suggests that they are not indifferent to developments in this area -notwithstanding that the magnitude of change in this period was quite extreme.
The disadvantages of "mandatory pensions" are not limited to lifetime low-income households. Many middle-income households begin their careers at income levels below the tax threshold. For these families it may be preferable to postpone savings until their income grows due to consumption smoothing and to yield considerations (losing the tax credit of 35 percent is equivalent to 9 years of -assumed -net returns in the pension fund). The current decree forces them to contribute in each month regardless of their income. Moreover, there is no provision for partial contributions which would allow couples to optimize their contributions with respect to their eligibility for tax credits -e.g., when women work part-time post-partum. This is a substantial restriction in the decree because half of those who did not contribute to pension before it was affected had a spouse that did. These individuals are also highly unlikely to need assistance from the OAA income supplement.
The initial concerns that led policy-makers to adopt the "mandatory-pension" had to do with the income distribution and the low-standard-of living of the elderly. It seems, however, that the policy-action they adopted, in its current setting, only harms further the weakest segments among the working population. The high income inequality appears to be a reflection of labor market outcomes and not a result of the restructured pre-compulsory pension system. While the pension decree may reduce future fiscal expenses of the OAA's income supplement, it will do so at the cost of increasing lifetime inequality and the effective tax-rate on the lifetime poor. A potential positive outcome of that may be raising labor market participation of non-working spouses from low-income households' to avoid the reduction in their allowance. However, this participation can be minimal as there is no floor for the necessary monthly working hours to meet the tenure requirement. Working couples may actually reduce their labor supply, due to the substitution effect; although Brender and Strawczynski (2006) and Brender and Gallo (2009) show that the elasticity of labor supply to wages is quite low in Israel.
Finally, if policy-makers are concerned with reducing the number of incomesupplement recipients, this target may be achieved in a way that is more consistent with retaining the lifetime neutrality of the pension system. One way to achieve it is by making the tax credits refundable while financing the additional cost by reducing the size of the credit to about 30 percent. Such a scheme will split the cost of reducing the income-supplement more evenly. 1 based on data for married men aged 30-55 with minimum annual income of 12,000 NIS and women with a minimum income of 6,000 NIS. 2 The share of those who do not work includes women whose husband's state that they work but they do not show-up in the tax authorities' records. 
